We show that the Italian wage curve, inexistent in the eighties and early nineties, has reemerged after the 1993 Income Policy Agreements, owing to the greater role granted to ‡exible and locally bargained top-up wage components.
Introduction
The existence of an inverse relation between wage levels and local unemployment (the so called "wage curve") has been con…rmed empirically in many countries. Nijkamp and Poot's (2005) survey reports an average wage-unemployment elasticity ( wU ) equal to -0.07 based on over 1000 estimates from most OECD countries. More recently, Sanz-de-Galdeano and Turunen (2006) estimated wU at -0.14 for the euro area as a whole. However, Montuenga et al. (2003) show that national wage curves exhibit more variability than originally indicated by Blanch ‡ower and Oswald (1994) . As European labour markets continue to be regulated at the national level, it remains crucial to study country speci…c wage curves and to understand how they are shaped by national reforms.
For Italy previous estimates have denied the existence of a wage curve up to the early '90s (Lucifora and Origo, 1999) . They ascribed it to the national wage bargaining setup, unable to fully incorporate local labour market conditions. In fact, until 1993 wages were set within a centralized wage setting process, accompanied by automatic price indexation. Aimed at curbing in ‡ation and increasing wage responsiveness to local conditions, the July 1993 Income Policy Agreement (IPA) abolished the indexation clause and introduced a new bargaining system, featuring two coordinated and specialized levels. The industry-wide national level is speci…cally devoted to defend the purchasing power of wages, now set according to the Government's targeted rate of in ‡ation.
The regional or …rm level is devoted to distribute additional (top-up) wage components, according to …rms' performance and local conditions. The resulting decentralization changed substantially the nature of the top-up components. Moreover, as unions agreed on setting low in ‡ation targets, wages set at the national level saw a new phase of moderation, which granted additional room to the more market driven top-up components. Accordingly, one may expect that both features of the new bargaining system have led to a resurrection of wage curve after 1993. This paper assesses whether IPA has been e¤ective in making the Italian wage structure more responsive to local unemployment. Indeed, we …nd that wU increases in absolute value and becomes statistically signi…cant after 1993. The paper also investigates the source of wage ‡exibility in an environment where collective contracts are still very in ‡uential. The answer is relevant for Italy as well as for other European countries, where these features are widespread. The role of decentralized top-up components, which became responsive to local unemployment after 1993, clearly emerges.
Data and …rst evidence
We use administrative data from social security archives processed in a public-use …le (Worker History Italian Panel, WHIP) by LABORatorio Revelli 1 , and randomly select an unbalanced panel of employees of private …rms observed at least twice between 1985 and 1999 (150,000 workers; 1 Detailed documentation can be found at www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip 2 1,300,000 observations). The available wage variable is the worker's average weekly wage. To minimize (unobserved) variability in the number of hours worked, the sample has been restricted to full-time employees with at least three months in continuous employment.
Individual top-up wage components have been reconstructed as employee's total wage in excess to her base wage. The base wage, as stipulated by the national contract the worker belongs to, is a minimum wage speci…c to each occupation within the contract, including any automatic price indexation. Top-up components refer therefore to both locally bargained wage components (secondlevel contracts and productivity premia; they account for half top-ups) and individual premia. Base wages are available and matched to WHIP for 22 main national contracts. The resulting "contracts'
sample" covers about 60% of our "full sample", slightly under-representing high wages. Note that, to investigate the role of second-level top up components, which cannot be negative by de…nition, the contracts' sample (but not the full sample) excludes workers whose total wage is below their base wage. 2 Section 4 compares the wage curve estimates with the two samples. 
Econometric strategy
The economic theory behind the wage curve has been widely debated (e.g., Card (1995) and Bell et al. (2003)). Independently of the theoretical model, the speci…cation of the wage curve has become quite standard, aiming at controlling as much as possible for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In this respect, the use of individual longitudinal data allows us to control for the changing composition of the workforce over the business cycle, and hence to minimize the downward bias on wage procyclicality that a¤ects aggregate data (Solon et al., 1994) .
We test the existence of a structural break after the 1993 IPA. This is a before-after estimator of the e¤ect of a universal reform (no viable control group). In section 4 we discuss the eventual role of confounding factors. We estimate the wage curve using as dependent variables both total wages and top-up components. Our prior is that the wage curve re-emerges after 1993 thanks to the new nature of top-up components in the post-1993 bargaining setup; i.e. we expect break < 0 in both speci…cations and larger in the second. We estimate:
where w ijt is the wage level (total wage or top-up components) of individual i in region j and year t. u jt is the local unemployment rate 3 , also interacted to D 1993 (a dummy signalling the period after 1993) to test break < 0. The s are individual, region and time …xed e¤ects, allowed to be correlated with one another and with the local unemployment rate ( j are dummies on 20 administrative regions and t on 15 years). P j 0 j D j t are region speci…c linear time trends, included to capture region speci…c wage pressure or regional variation in working hours (Bell et al., 2002 ).
ijt includes time varying controls 4 . Equation (1) is estimated through the e¢ cient …xed-e¤ect transformation to remove the individual …xed e¤ect i . Estimated standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and are corrected for clustering on region. Some studies using region-level data also control for the possible endogeneity of unemployment (Baltagi and Blien, 1998) . We have conducted the C-test of exogeneity estimating an IV-…xed e¤ects model on aggregate data at the regional level and using lagged average x (k)
:jt as excluded instruments, as in Baltagi and Blien (1998) . We cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of u jt both for the total wage and for the top-up wage component speci…cation 5 .
Empirical results
Our main results are reported in table 1. We obtain no signi…cant elasticity ( ) before the reform 6 , negative and signi…cant after 1993 ( + break ). break is always strongly statistically signi…cant.
This result is not a¤ected by the way we introduce the break in equation (1). If we allow the unemployment elasticity to be di¤erent across four sub-periods (table 2), is not signi…cant for the 1985-1988 and 1989-1993 subperiods; on the contrary, a wage curve reemerges for the 1994-1997 subperiod and even more so for the 1998-99 subperiod, partly owing to the graduality with which the new dispositions have been received in the actual bargaining process. 3 Regional unemployment (standard ILO classi…cation). This is the most disaggregate unemployment series that is consistent over the whole 1985-99 period. 4 Age (quadratic), dummies for 4 occupations, 5 …rm size classes, 8 industries, as well as for spells of health or maternity leave or temporary layo¤s. 5 Total wages: X 2 =1.366, p-value=.505. Top up components: X 2 =2.675, p-value=.263. IV pass both relevance and overidenti…cation tests. 6 Exceptions are white collars and northern regions. This may be related to our inability to separate cadres from white collars: cadres (more concentrated in northern regions) have always enjoyed a very signi…cant individual bargaining over wages.
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Although statistically signi…cant, an elasticity of -0.029 (s.e. 0.009) is low. In fact it is well below the -0.1 result reported by Blanch ‡ower and Oswald (1994) for many countries (including Italy, although their result is not robust to the inclusion of regional …xed e¤ects). However, it is comparable to the -0.025 elasticity estimated for the U.K. by Bell et al. (2002) with administrative data. To properly compare our results to theirs, we replicate their dynamic speci…cation, including the lagged wage in equation (1) and restricting the sample to males appearing every year (T = 15) of the panel to minimize the small T bias on the …xed e¤ects estimator. 7 In this case we expect a lower elasticity, as a balanced sample excludes frequent movers, entrants and less protected workers in general. In fact, the short run elasticity after 1993 decreases to -0.014 (s.e. 0.004) 8 , lower than that estimated for the most deregulated labour market in Europe. Furthermore, that we obtain a signi…cant elasticity also after excluding entrants, denies a leading role to a possible confounding factor, i.e. the 1997 liberalization of temporary contracts. Even though the elasticity increases again after 1997 (table 2) , it is signi…cant both in the 1994-1997 period and excluding entrants altogether.
Our second and most novel result relates to the source of recovered wage ‡exibility: the top-up components are providing room for ‡exibility in the wage structure after 1993. Their unemployment elasticity becomes signi…cant after 1993 and is much higher, at -0.076, than the elasticity displayed by total wages (table 1 and table 2 ).
To investigate this point further, we move to quantile regression versions of equation (1), for both the total wage and the top-up components. We also discuss the e¤ect of estimating the elasticities over our full sample versus the more selected contracts'sample 9 .
Estimated + break are plotted in …gure 3.A against percentiles, using the "contracts' sample" 10 . Both total wage and top-up's elasticities are signi…cant at 95% con…dence level from percentile 50 onward 11 . The elasticity of wages is increasingly higher (in absolute value) the higher the percentile. This is because the elasticity of their top-up components is increasingly higher the higher the percentile. It is worth noticing that when top-up components are low they (and total wages) are not able to respond to changes in local labour market conditions. The contracts'sample excludes fringe workers and some high wage workers, so providing a lower bound of ‡exibility. In fact, total wage elasticity estimated with the contracts' sample decreases to -0.023 (s.e. 0.004). Figure 3 .B plots + break of quantile regressions estimated over the whole sample, which can be done for total wages only. The estimated elasticities, all signi…cant at 95% 7 Kiviet (1995) provides an alternative method, not used here for comparability reasons. 8 Unemployment elasticity in the long run is -0.053 in the U.K. and -0.033 (s.e. 0.008) in Italy. 9 Results for the full sample are also needed for comparability with earlier empirical work. 1 0 The correlation coe¢ cient between the percentiles of the total wage and of the top-up components is 94%. The two series of quantile regression estimates can therefore be safely compared 1 1 Pre-1993 elasticities are statistically insigni…cant at each quantile, and are not shown.
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con…dence level 12 , illustrate the e¤ect of re-introducing in the sample the excluded high wage workers and fringe workers (with sub-standard employment contracts). In this case, both high and low wages (in the …rst two deciles) display more post-1993 responsiveness to local unemployment than wages in the middle of the distribution. As low wage workers do not have signi…cant top-ups, their increased wage ‡exibility cannot be imputed to IPA; instead, it may point to a decreased protection of marginal workers in the new labor market environment.
The 1993 break is found in many di¤erent groups of workers, and no particular group drives the result (Table 1) . However, as expected, elasticity is higher in industries facing more international competition, and for women. Top-up components are more sensitive to local labour market conditions for white collars (vs blue collars), large …rms (vs small/medium …rms), northern (vs southern)
regions, consistently with the larger top-up components received by these groups. 13 At the same time, the total wage elasticity for blue-collars, small and southern regions is slightly higher, consistently with the larger proportion found in these groups of low-wage / high-elasticity (fringe) workers.
Our …nal comments concern the role of potential confounding factors. One may argue that the wage curve would have resurrected even in the absence of IPA, as a result of general trends towards stronger international competition and closer European integration 14 . However, the sharp break in table 2 suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, as shown in table 1, the wage curve resurrected also among …rms not facing international competition. Hence we are con…dent in stating that the Italian wage curve resurrected after the 1993 Income Policy Agreement, as it created a new institutional setting that allowed …rms to better adjust their wage structure to the local pressures of a changing economic environment.
Conclusions
We have shown the existence of a signi…cant structural break after the 1993 IPA, which allowed wages to become more responsive to local unemployment. The result is related to the increased elasticity of decentralized top-up wage components, at -0.076 after 1993. That top-up components only take up 22% of total wages on average explains why the resurrected wage curve still looks a bit anaemic, with a -0.029 wage-unemployment elasticity. 1 2 The higher precision of these estimates may be related to the larger sample size. 1 3 The elasticity of top-ups is larger for women (vs men); however women's elasticity is not very precisely estimated. 1 4 In e¤ect, the IPA itself may have been triggered by the pressure of the new competing environment.
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